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Meritless Historical Arguments in
Second Amendment Litigation 
by MARK ANTHONY FRASSETTO*
Introduction 
In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held for 
the first time that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to 
possess firearms for purposes of self-defense.1  The Court’s decision, written 
by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, was the culmination of a decades-long 
effort advocating for an individual-rights reading of the Second Amendment 
and the application of an originalist legal methodology in which rights have 
a fixed historical meaning.2  Specifically, under Justice Scalia’s 
methodology, the fixed meaning of an individual right is the original public 
understanding, that is, how the right would have been understood by the 
average informed speaker of the English language at the time of its 
ratification.3  Justice Scalia’s opinion looked at centuries of historical 
treatises, statutes, and cases to come to the conclusion that the original public 
       *    Senior Counsel; Deputy Director, Second Amendment History and Scholarship, 
Everytown for Gun Safety, B.A. Marquette University, J.D. Georgetown University Law Center.  
I would like to thank Eric Ruben, Saul Cornell, William J. Taylor Jr., and my wife for their 
comments and suggestions.  I’d also like to thank Hannah Shearer, Adam Skaggs, and the students 
of the UC Hastings College of the Law for all of their work organizing this symposium and volume.  
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those 
of Everytown for Gun Safety.
 1.  554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 2.  Lawrence Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
923, 924 (2009) (“Collectively, the opinions in Heller represent the most important and extensive 
debate on the role of original meaning in constitutional interpretation among the members of the 
contemporary Supreme Court.”); see also Mark Anthony Frassetto, The Use and Misuse of History 
in Second Amendment Litigation, in THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND 
THE DEBATE ON THE 2ND AMENDMENT (Jennifer Tucker, Bart Hacker & Margaret Vining eds.) 
(forthcoming 2019). 
 3.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–77 (“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that 
‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in 
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’”) (citing United States v. 
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)). 
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meaning of the Second Amendment was to protect an individual right to keep 
and bear arms rather than a right tied to militia service.4
Since Heller and the subsequent Supreme Court decision, McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, which incorporated the individual right against the states, 
Second Amendment litigation and scholarship has focused in large part on 
questions about the historical understanding of the Second Amendment.5
One area where this historical analysis has been especially pronounced is in 
litigation over the scope of the Second Amendment right outside of the 
home.6  Litigants, amici (including the organization which employs the 
author of this article), and scholars fiercely debate the meaning of historical 
statutes, treatises, and cases, arguing about the scope of the right to carry 
arms outside of the home at the time of the Second and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ ratifications.7  These debates address historical statutes, cases, 
treatises, and other legal sources spanning two countries and several 
centuries. 
Most law review articles attempt to address difficult or hotly contested 
legal issues.  This is not one of those kinds of articles.  Rather than address 
the hard questions about the originalist methodology or the complicated 
firearms regulatory landscape surrounding the ratification of the Second and 
Fourteenth Amendments, this article will address the frivolous arguments 
 4.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 616. The Heller majority’s conclusion remains a hotly contested 
question.  It was a sharp break from the Court’s previous jurisprudence and the Court split 5-4 in 
the case. See also United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (upholding registration requirement 
for sawed-off shotgun based on an understanding of the Second Amendment tied closely to militia 
service).  Recent linguistics scholarship has called the Heller Court’s conclusions about the original 
public meaning into serious doubt.  See Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: 
“bear”, LAWNLINGUISTICS (Dec. 16, 2018), https://lawnlinguistics.com/corpora-and-the-second-
amendment (discussing meaning of the term “bear” at the time of the ratification of the Second 
Amendment); Allison L. LaCroix, Historical Semantics and the Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, THE PANORAMA, Aug. 3, 2018, http://thepanorama.shear.org/2018/08/03/historical-
semantics-and-the-meaning-of-the-second-amendment/.  Professor Dennis Baron’s article in this 
volume further elaborates on this research, Dennis Baron, Corpus Evidence Illuminates the 
Meaning of Bear Arms, 46 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 509 (2019). 
 5.  561 U.S. 742 (2010). See, e.g., Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018); Wrenn 
v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Peruta v. Cty. Of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 
(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 6.  Young, 896 F.3d 1044; Wrenn, 864 F.3d 650; Peruta, 824 F.3d 919. 
 7.  See e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety in Support of Appellees and 
Affirmance, Peruta v. Cty. Of San Diego (9th Cir. Apr. 30, 2015) (Nos. 10-56971, 11-16255); Brief 
of Amicus Curiae National Rifle Association of America, Inc. in Support of Appellants and 
Reversal, Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659 (1st Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2202); Eric M. Ruben & Saul 
Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in 
Context, 125 YALE L.J. F. 121 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/firearm-regionalism-
and-public-carry; David B. Kopel, The History of Firearm Magazines and Magazine Prohibitions,
88 ALB. L. REV. 849 (2015). 
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made by many plaintiffs in Second Amendment cases, some of which have 
unfortunately made their way into district and circuit court decisions.  These 
arguments, often made in a misleading sentence or two, usually take a few 
paragraphs to effectively rebut, paragraphs which the state and local 
governments defending against challenges to gun laws generally do not have 
the time, necessary expertise, or word count to include in their briefing.  This 
article aims to provide easy answers to these arguments, hopefully allowing 
both the courts and the parties to focus on the serious issues of debate. 
This article is not asserting that all the historical issues surrounding the 
Second Amendment are simple, or subject to easy answers.  There are serious 
arguments about history to be made by both sides in Second Amendment 
scholarship and litigation.  Many have been made by the scholars 
contributing to this volume.8  Assessing the original public meaning of rights 
based on centuries-old legal traditions, which requires the analysis of case 
law and statutes drawn from an unfamiliar legal tradition and culture, is not 
easy work and does not yield simple answers.  Unfortunately, these issues 
worthy of serious discussion are often obscured by frivolous arguments that 
require time-consuming responses and take focus away from the actual 
issues in the case. 
Part II of this article will discuss post-Heller public-carry litigation, 
focusing on the serious historical arguments driving these cases.  Part III will 
discuss and rebut some of the meritless historical arguments that have been 
made and adopted in Second Amendment litigation, specifically (a) 
anecdotes about the founders carrying firearms in public or advocating for 
the carrying of firearms in public; (b) the argument that founding-era militia 
and other public defense obligations meant a reciprocal right to generally 
carry firearms in public for self-defense existed; and (c) the claim that the 
only weapons which could not be carried in public were those deemed 
‘dangerous and unusual.’  Finally, Part IV of the article will draw 
conclusions about these materials. 
 8.  Saul Cornell, The Right to Keep and Carry Arms in Anglo-American Law: Preserving 
Liberty and Keeping the Peace, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11 (2017); David Kopel, George 
Mocsary et al., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS AND 
POLICY (2012); The Second Amendment Wild Card: The Persisting Relevance of the “Hybrid” 
Interpretation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 81 TENN. L. REV. 597 (2014); Darrell Miller, 
Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (2017). 
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I.  Major Historical Issues in Post-Heller Second Amendment 
Public Carry Litigation. 
In 2010, two years after the Heller decision, the Supreme Court returned 
to the Second Amendment in McDonald v. City of Chicago, in which it 
incorporated the Second Amendment against the states and struck down the 
city’s prohibition on handguns.9  After the McDonald decision, gun rights 
activists began challenging a broad scope of state and local gun laws across 
the country. Among the most prominent Second Amendment cases were 
challenges to state public carry licensing laws.10  These challenges primarily 
focused on laws completely prohibiting the carrying of firearms in public 
and licensing systems that required those seeking to carry firearms in public 
to make a showing that they had a need for self-defense greater than that of 
the general public.11
Since Heller, virtually every circuit court has adopted a method of 
analyzing Second Amendment cases known as the two-part test.12  This test 
first asks whether a challenged firearm (or sometimes other weapon) 
regulation restricts conduct that falls within the scope of the right protected 
by the Second Amendment as historically understood.  A court makes this 
determination using the text of the Second Amendment and the history and 
tradition of firearms regulation in the United States and England.13  If the 
regulation does not fall within the scope of the right as historically 
understood, then the challenge fails.14  However, if the regulation does 
implicate the right, then the court applies some level of scrutiny determined 
on a sliding scale, from intermediate scrutiny for less significant 
infringements such as licensing to a categorical prohibition on laws such as 
the handgun bans struck down in Heller and McDonald.15
Given this methodology, it should be unsurprising that in every major 
challenge to public carry regulations, historical arguments have played an 
 9.  561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 10.  See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012); Kachalsky v. County of 
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d. Cir. 2012); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d. Cir. 2013); Woollard 
v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 
2016).
 11.  See, e.g., Moore, 702 F.3d (complete prohibition); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d (good cause); 
Drake, 724 F.3d (good cause) Woollard, 712 F.3d (good cause); Peruta, 824 F.3d (good cause). 
 12.  See Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 668–69 (1st Cir. 2018) (adopting the two-part test 
and discussing its near universal adoption in other circuits). 
 13.  Id.
 14.  Id. at 669. 
 15.  Id.
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important role in the courts’ analysis.16  In the cases immediately after 
McDonald, the post-Heller Second Amendment historical scholarship had 
not had time to produce historical research and analysis responsive to Heller,
so the history presented, and the courts’ analysis, is a bit scattershot and 
unsophisticated compared to later cases.  In the last five years an enormous 
amount of research into the historical regulation of firearms has resulted in 
clarification of the issues at dispute in the historical debate.17
In these more recent cases the historical arguments essentially break 
down into four categories of sources: (1) English history and founding-era 
regulation; (2) Antebellum firearms regulation; (3) Antebellum and 
Reconstruction-era case law; and (4) postbellum regulation. 
The debate about English and founding-era-American history primarily 
focuses on how the carrying of weapons in public was regulated during the 
eighteenth century.  This is important because Heller stated the Second 
Amendment “was widely understood to codify a pre-existing right, rather 
than to fashion a new one.”18  Therefore, if the carrying of firearms was 
prohibited in England or the United States during the founding period, then 
the right ratified in the Second Amendment could not reasonably be 
understood to protect an activity that the founding generation prohibited.  
This debate largely centers around the eighteenth-century understanding of 
a fourteenth-century English statute prohibiting going armed “by night or by 
day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of the Justices or other Ministers 
nor in no part elsewhere.”19  Gun rights advocates and some scholars claim 
that by the eighteenth century, the statute had developed a mens rea
component, meaning a violation occurred only if a person carrying arms had 
the intent or purpose to terrorize or threaten.20  Conversely, scholars and 
litigators arguing for a more limited right argue that public terror was the 
 16.  See, e.g., Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 94–97; Drake, 724 F.3d at 432–35; Peruta, 824 F.3d at 
929–39. 
 17.  See, e.g., Repository of Historical Gun Laws, DUKE U. SCH. OF L., https://law.duke.edu/g 
unlaws/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (massive repository of historical firearms regulations produced 
after Heller). 
 18.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 603 (2008). 
 19.  Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, 258, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.). 
 20.  Brief of Amici Curiae National Rifle Association of America, Inc. in Support of 
Appellants and Reversal at 9, Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659 (1st Cir. Dec. 15, 2017) (No. 17-
2202) (“The requirement of an intent to terrify the public was carried down by English courts into 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.”); Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and 
Bear Arms For Self Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1443, 1481 (2009) (“Even carrying normally dangerous arms was punishable if it was done in a 
way that indicated a likely hostile intent, perhaps simply by the unusualness of the behavior . . . .”). 
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natural result of going armed in public and no additional intent was necessary 
for the conduct to be prohibited.21
Litigants also debate the meaning of Antebellum-era public-carry laws.  
The most significant controversy surrounds the meaning of a law first passed 
in Massachusetts in 1836 prohibiting going armed “without reasonable cause 
to fear an assault or other injury, or violence to his person, or family or 
property,” and allowing violators to be arrested and forced to post a bond 
upon application from “any person having reasonable cause to fear an injury 
or breach of the peace.”22  Disputes over the meaning of this law again 
revolve around whether violating the law required an intent to terrify or 
threaten, as well as whether the requirement to pay a surety bond constituted 
a criminal sanction.23
The dispute over Antebellum case law is a bit more complicated.  
Proponents of a broad right to carry firearms in public cite to several, mostly 
Southern, cases in which courts either struck down complete prohibitions on 
public carry or upheld complete prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons 
because those desiring to carry firearms could still do so openly (exposed 
outside of the clothing).24  Advocates for a more limited right respond by 
arguing that these cases are outliers representing a uniquely Southern view 
of gun rights driven by white Southerners’ fears of a slave uprising.25  They 
 21.  Patrick Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home, Take Two: How 
We Got Here and Why it Matters, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 468–69 (2016) (discussing the 
development of the narrow interpretation of the Statute of Northampton which developed in the 
mid twentieth century); see, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, & CRPA 
Foundation in Support of Appellees and in Support of Affirmance at 14, Wrenn v. District of 
Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 15-7057) (“No State prohibited the Public Carrying 
of Arms in the Early Republic.”); Mark Anthony Frassetto, The First Congressional Debate on 
Public Carry and What it Tells Us About Firearm Regionalism, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 335, 338 
(2018) (noting disagreement); Brief of Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety in Support of 
Appellants and Reversal at 6, Grace v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2016) 
(No. 16-7067) (“In other words, because carrying a dangerous weapon (such as a firearm) in 
populated public places naturally terrified the people, it was a crime against the peace—even if 
unaccompanied by a threat, violence, or any additional breach of the peace.”)  
 22.  1836 Mass. Acts 750, c. 134, § 16.  
 23.  Ruben & Cornell, supra note 7; David Kopel, Ninth Circuit strikes Hawaii law that only 
security guards may get handgun carry permits, REASON.COM: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 
24, 2018), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/07/24/ninth-circuit-upholds-right-to-licensed.  
 24.  Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846), State 
v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 617 (1840). 
 25.  Ruben & Cornell, supra note 7; see also Mark Anthony Frassetto, The Law and Politics 
of Firearms Regulation in Reconstruction Texas, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 95 (2016) (showing a more 
permissive Southern view); Mark Anthony Frassetto, The First Congressional Debate on Public 
Carry and What it Tells Us About Firearms Regionalism, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 335 (2018) 
(showing broad support among Northerners and Republicans for public carry regulations and 
opposition among many Southern Democrats).  
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also argue that even in the South, this understanding of the right was not 
monolithic and shifted in the direction of a more limited right by the time of 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.26  Further, most Southern 
decisions do not actually call into doubt the most frequently challenged 
public carry systems, which allow the carrying of firearms when necessary 
for self-defense.27
Finally, those arguing for the legality of public carry regulations claim 
that post-war laws completely prohibiting carrying weapons in populated 
areas or requiring a particular need for self-defense to carry concealed 
weapons show that modern licensing laws that require a showing of self-
defense are longstanding and therefore consistent with the Second 
Amendment.28  Those challenging gun laws attempt to minimize the 
importance and scope of the laws banning carry in urban areas.  They also 
argue that because many of the good cause laws do not discuss the open carry 
of firearms, they allowed for a broad right carry in public. 
The author has strong views on all these historical debates and believes 
that the history of firearms regulation supports the constitutionality of laws 
prohibiting carrying without a showing of specific need.29  That being said, 
these debates all raise complicated historical issues that require significant 
research and analysis to fully understand and are, to some degree, subject to 
varying interpretations.  In contrast, the next section discusses the historical 
arguments frequently used in Second Amendment litigation that do not 
require this level of analysis to determine that they are historically 
inaccurate. 
 26.  State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840); State v. 
Huntly, 25 N.C. 418 (1843); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165 (1871); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 
(1872); State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455 (1874). 
 27.  But see Bliss, 12 Ky. at 91–92 (“whatever restrains the full and complete exercise of that 
right, though not an entire destruction of it, is forbidden by the explicit language of the 
constitution.”).
 28.  See e.g., 1869 N.M. Laws 321, § 1 (totally prohibiting carry in populated areas); 1871 
Tex. Laws 1322, art. 6512 (prohibiting carry without “reasonable grounds for fearing an unlawful 
attack on his person” that was “immediate and pressing.”); 1873 Minn. Laws, 1025, §17 (similar, 
in the vein of the Massachusetts model discussed above); 1875 Wyo. Laws 352, ch. 52, § 1907 
(prohibiting carrying in populated areas). 
 29.  See e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety in Support of Appellees and 
Affirmance, Peruta v. Cty. Of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 10-56971, 11-16255).  
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II.  Meritless Historical Arguments in
Second Amendment Litigation. 
A.  Anecdotes About the Founders Carrying Firearms in Public 
Plaintiffs in Second Amendment public carry cases frequently cite to 
anecdotes about members of the founding generation carrying firearms in 
support of arguments for a broad right to carry firearms in public.30  They 
use these anecdotes to make two claims: (1) a general right to carry firearms 
in public was protected by the term “bear arms” in the Second Amendment; 
and (2) carrying firearms in public was not prohibited at the time the Second 
Amendment was ratified.  Some courts have accepted these arguments.  In 
an opinion striking down Washington, D.C.’s public carry licensing system, 
District Court Judge Richard Leon stated that “it is unquestionable that the 
public carrying of firearms was widespread during the colonial and founding 
Eras” and that fact “provide[s] an essential context for what the people who 
ratified the Second Amendment understood arms bearing to entail.”31
However, Judge Leon also acknowledged that “‘the simple fact that the 
Framers engaged in certain conduct does not necessarily prove they forbade 
its prohibition by government.’”32
Arms-carrying for purposes of hunting, sport, and collective self-
defense was likely common in parts of the largely agrarian founding-era 
America.  One founding-era source stated: “In many parts of the United 
States, a man no more thinks, of going out of his house on any occasion, 
without his rifle or musket in his hand, than an European fine gentleman 
without his sword by his side.”33  However, gun rights advocates’ evidence 
of the founders commonly carrying firearms in public while going about 
normal activities is remarkably weak.  Presumably, these highly motivated 
organizations, including the National Rifle Association and its affiliated 
scholars, have done their utmost to find the sources most strongly supporting 
their view of the Second Amendment.  Yet their evidence is so thin and the 
anecdotes they cite are so easily rebuttable that the absence of any strong 
 30.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23–24, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March 
5, 2018); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Malpasso v. Pallozzi, No. 18-2377 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 2018).
 31.  Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124, 136 (D.D.C. 2016).  
 32.  Id.  (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (Thomas, J. 
concurring)).
 33.  5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES app. B, 19 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803); 
See also Mark Anthony Frassetto, To The Terror of the People: Public Disorder Crimes and the 
Original Public Understanding of the Second Amendment, 43 S. ILL. L. REV. 61, 85 (2018) 
(discussing the regional nature of Tucker’s description, which would have varied greatly by in more 
urban parts of the early Republic). 
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evidence, at least to some degree, undermines their claim that carrying in 
public was common among the founders.
1.  George Washington 
Plaintiffs have been especially eager to enlist examples of the 
Revolutionary War commander-in-chief and first president carrying firearms 
in public to support their claim that public carry was not regulated during the 
founding generation.34  The examples they have found, however, have not 
supported these claims.  In a recent challenge to the public carry licensing 
systems in Boston and Brookline, Massachusetts, the plaintiffs stated, “[t]he 
practices of the Founding generation confirm that the right to carry arms was 
well-established. George Washington, for example, carried a firearm on an 
expedition into the Ohio Country.”35
The Plaintiffs’ cited source discusses a military and diplomatic 
expedition by George Washington under orders from Virginia’s governor, to 
travel through the Ohio frontier to a French Fort to warn the French against 
further intruding into the Ohio territory.36  During the time of the expedition, 
Washington was an adjutant major overseeing Virginia’s militia.37  The Ohio 
territory through which Washington travelled was largely unsettled, having 
been set aside for the Native Americans by British decree, and the expedition 
faced possible attacks from both Native Americans and the French.38  In fact, 
on the exact page cited by the Plaintiffs, the author, Washington’s travel 
companion, describes an attack by a Native American guide and threats that 
the nearby Ottawa tribe would scalp Washington and his companions.39
Washington and his companions going armed in these circumstances, when 
he was a high-ranking military officer travelling through hostile territory on 
orders from the governor obviously does nothing to “confirm that the right 
 34.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March 5, 2018); 
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Malpasso v. Pallozzi, No. 18-2377 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 2018); Grace,
187 F. Supp. 3d at 137.  
 35.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23–24, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March 
5, 2018) (citing WILLIAM M. DARLINGTON, CHRISTOPHER GIST’S JOURNALS 85–86 (1893); see
also Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Malpasso v. Pallozzi at 19, No. 18-2377 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 
2018).
 36.  George Washington and The French and Indian War, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT 
VERNON, https://www.mountvernon.org/george-washington/french-indian-war/washington-and-
the-french-indian-war/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).  
 37.  Id.
 38.  See generally, The French and Indian War, BRITTANICA.COM, https://www.britannica.com/  
event/French-and-Indian-War (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).  
 39.  See WILLIAM M. DARLINGTON, CHRISTOPHER GIST’S JOURNALS 85–86 (1893), 
https://archive.org/details/christophergists00gistuoft. 
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to carry arms was well established.”40  The First Circuit did not buy this 
argument, instead upholding Boston and Brookline’s public carry systems 
under intermediate scrutiny. 
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia, which cited to a perhaps even more 
absurd historical anecdote in its Grace v. District of Columbia decision
enjoining enforcement of Washington, D.C.’s public carry licensing 
system.41  The anecdote continues to be cited by plaintiffs challenging public 
carry licensing systems.42
To understand why relying on this anecdote makes little sense, it is most 
helpful to cite it in full: 
Soon after the close of the Revolutionary War, General 
Washington went to Alexandria on horseback, accompanied by 
his negro servant.  The road then used lay through the farm of a 
desperado who had committed murder, a stranger to the General, 
the main road having become impassable.  As was then the 
custom, the General had holsters with pistols in them, to his 
saddle.  On returning to Mount Vernon, as General was about to 
enter on this private road, a stranger on horseback barred the way, 
and said to him, “You shall not pass this way.”  “You don’t know 
me,” said the General.  “Yes, I do,” said the ruffian: “you are 
General Washington, who commanded the army in the 
Revolution and if you attempt to pass me I shall shoot you.”  
General Washington called his servant, Billy, to him, and taking 
out a pistol, examined the priming, and then handed it to Billy, 
saying, “if this person shoots me, do you shoot him;” and cooly 
passed on without molestation.43
This story comes from a privately published semi-biographical book 
written from the papers of Benjamin Ogloe Tayloe, a wealthy plantation 
owner and prominent Whig supporter of the Jacksonian and late-Antebellum 
 40.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March 5, 
2018).
 41.  Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124, 137 (D.D.C. 2016) (“For example, 
when George Washington traveled between Alexandria and Mount Vernon he holstered pistols to 
his saddle “[a]s was then the custom.”).  
 42.  See Brief of Michelle Flanagan et. al. at 26, Flanagan v. Becerra, No. 18-55717 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 2, 2018) (citing Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 136–37). 
 43.  BENJAMIN OGLE TAYLOE, IN MEMORIAM: BENJAMIN OGLE TAYLOE 95 (1872).  
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era.44  The book was commissioned by his widow as a memorial to her 
deceased husband.45  The anecdote relied on in the Grace decision comes 
from a section of the book titled “Anecdotes and Reminiscences” comprised 
of a series of jokes, tall tales, and farfetched stories.46  These vignettes were 
written by Tayloe “during the dark and gloomy days of the Civil War,” sixty 
years after Washington’s death, to “relieve his mind from the depressing 
influence of the times.”47  Tayloe’s stories are clearly not anything 
resembling history. 
The two other stories about Washington in Tayloe’s book show why his 
narrative should not be relied on.  The first describes a scene between George 
and Martha Washington as they were lying in bed, during which Martha 
Washington lectured her husband and George Washington, after listening 
silently, responded “Good night, Mrs. Washington” and turned away from 
her in bed.48  This joke about marital roles was described as “b[earing] 
internal evidence of truth.”49
The following story in Tayloe’s book falls even further into the absurd.  
In it a young Washington travelling in the back-country of Virginia stumbled 
upon and then won a jumping competition for the hand of a wealthy young 
woman in marriage.50  Washington then saw that the woman preferred 
another competitor and, being the model of chivalry, forfeited his prize and 
allowed the couple to marry.51  Other anecdotes mostly appear to have 
revolved around puns and it does not appear that Tayloe intended for readers 
to understand them as true.52
In the context of Tayloe’s entire book—a compilation of assorted 
papers and journals written by a man born three years before Washington 
died—the humorous anecdote about George Washington seems intended to 
convey a sense of Washington’s courage rather than a retelling of an actual 
 44.  Benjamin Ogle Tayloe, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Ogle_ 
Tayloe (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
 45.  TAYLOE, supra note 43, at 93.   
 46.  Id.
 47.  Id. at 94.  
 48.  Id. at 95–96 (“At Mount Vernon a guest who slept in an adjacent chamber is reported to 
have heard a curtain lecture from Mrs. Washington  to her lord The General received it in silence 
and at last said Good night Mrs Washington and was heard to turn over bed Mr. Buchanan when I 
related the above remarked that bore with it internal evidence of its truth.”).  
 49.  Id.
 50.  Id. at 96.  
 51.  Id.
52.  Id. at 99.  
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event.53  This is not the type of history from which decisions about the 
original public meaning of the Second Amendment should be made.54
2.  John Adams 
Another anecdote supposedly showing the founding fathers supporting 
a broad right to carry in public comes from John Adams’s legal 
representation of the British soldiers on trial for the Boston Massacre.55  Gun 
rights groups claim: “John Adams conceded that, ‘in this country, every 
private person is authorized to arm himself; and on the strength of this 
authority I do not deny the inhabitants had a right to arm themselves at that 
time for their defence.’”56  The Grace court adopted this view.57
The supposed example of John Adams supporting public carry comes 
from remarks he made during his defense of British soldiers in the Boston 
Massacre trial.58  However, contrary to the gun rights plaintiffs’ 
characterization, Adams was not discussing a general right to carry, but 
rather specifically talking about how people have a right to arm themselves 
to put down riots, the action which the soldiers were engaged in.  The full 
quote makes this clear: 
And so, perhaps the killing of dangerous rioters may be justified 
by any private persons, who cannot otherwise suppress them or 
defend themselves from them, inasmuch as every private person 
seems to authorized by the law to arm himself for the purpose 
aforesaid. – Hawkins, p. 71 § 14. 
 53.  Even if the story were true, it describes Washington riding armed in a rural area when 
faced with a specific threat, “a desperado who had committed murder,” providing little support for 
the modern argument that carrying guns in public is generally allowed.  TAYLOE, supra note 43, at 
95.   
 54.  One interesting point is that Tayloe felt the need to say, “[a]s was then the custom, the 
General had holsters with pistols in them, to his saddle,” implying that in the 1860s when these 
anecdotes are written it would not have been usual to go armed in public.  Id. at 95.  It seems 
meaningful that in the only period of which Tayloe has direct knowledge it was apparently not the 
custom to ride armed. 
 55.  British soldiers had killed five colonists during a violent confrontation between British 
soldiers and the locals.  While the event was portrayed by patriots like Samuel Adams and Paul 
Revere as a massacre of a peaceful crowd, the soldiers were tried and acquitted on most charges 
after able representation by John Adams.  DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 65–68 (2001). 
 56.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 24, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March 5, 
2018) (citing John Adams, First Day’s Speech in Defense of the British Soldiers Accused of 
Murdering Attucks, Gray and Others, in the Boston Riot of 1770, in 6 MASTERPIECES OF 
ELOQUENCE 2569, 2578 (Hazeltine et al. eds., 1905)); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19, 
Malpasso v. Palozzi, No. 18-2377 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 2018).  
 57.  Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124, 137 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 58.  Adams, supra note 56, at 2560–93.  
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Here every private person is authorized to arm himself; and on 
the strength of this authority I do not deny the inhabitants had a 
right to arms themselves at that time for their defence, not for 
offence.  That distinction is material and must be attended to.59
The citation to William Hawkins comes from Adams’s discussion of 
justifiable homicide and the circumstances in which a killing in self-defense 
would be legal.60  During the portion of his remarks relied upon by gun rights 
plaintiffs and the Grace court, Adams was citing a variety of sources 
explaining when lethal force could be used in self-defense.61  Reading the 
passage in the context of the citations to legal authority both immediately 
following and preceding it, by far the most sensible reading is that the 
language was tied to suppressing riots rather than a generalized right to carry. 
Breaking it down in more detail, Adams’s line, “[h]ere every private 
person is authorized to arm himself,” is in reference to the immediately 
preceding line, “every private person is authorized to arm himself for the 
purpose aforesaid.”62  That is, every person is authorized to arm oneself to 
defend against and suppress rioters.  Adams’s next line, “on the strength of 
 59.  Adams, supra note 56, at 2578. 
 60.  1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 81 (John Curwood 
ed., 8th ed. 1824) (same language from later edition). 
 61.  Adams, supra note 56, at 2577 (citing MICHAEL FOSTER, CROWN CASES 274 (Michael 
Dodson ed. 1762) “Where a known felony is attempted upon the person be it to rob or murder here 
the party assaulted may repel force with force”); id. (“Yet it seems that a private person a fortiori 
an officer of justice who happens unavoidably to kill another in endeavoring to defend himself from 
or suppress dangerous rioters may justify the fact inasmuch as he only does his duty in aid of the 
public justice”) (citing HAWKINS, supra note 60, at 73);  
And I can see no reason Why a person who without provocation is assaulted by 
another in any place whatsoever in such a manner as plainly shows an intent to murder 
him as by discharging a pistol or pushing at him with a drawn sword etc may not 
justify killing such an assailant as much as if he had attempted to rob him For is not 
he who attempts to murder me more injurious than he who barely attempts to rob me 
And can it be more justifiable to fight for my goods than for my life. 
Id. (citing HAWKINS, supra note 60, at 72);  
And not only he who on an assault retreats to the wall or some such strait beyond 
which he can go no further before he kills the other is judged by the law to act upon 
unavoidable necessity but also he who being assaulted in such a manner and in such 
a place that he cannot go back without manifestly endangering his life kills the other 
without retreating at all. 
Id. at 2578 (citing HAWKINS, supra note 60, at 75;  
Id. (“And an officer who kills one that insults him in the execution of his office and where a private 
person that kills one who feloniously assaults him in the highway may justify the fact without ever 
giving back at all.”) (citing HAWKINS, supra note 60, at 75).   
 62.  Id. at 2577–78.  
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this authority the inhabitants had a right to arm themselves at that time for 
their defence, not for offence[,]” references the authority of the Hawkins 
citation.63  Adams then states that the distinction between arming for 
purposes of offence and “defence,” “must be attended to[,]” before citing a 
pair of Hawkins citations about self-defense.64
This reading of the Adams quote places it sensibly within the context 
of Adams’s discussion about the circumstances of the Boston Massacre and 
when self-defense was allowed under the law of the time.  On the other hand, 
the reading of the passage by gun rights activists makes Adams’s statement 
a non sequitur detached completely from the context of Adam’s defense of 
the British soldiers and discussion of self-defense standards. 
3.  Thomas Jefferson 
One of the most prominent and most outrageous of the founder public 
carry anecdotes comes from a letter written by Thomas Jefferson to his 
nephew Peter Carr.65  The Grace decision cited to this letter in which 
Jefferson “advised his nephew to ‘[l]et your gun . . . be the constant 
companion of your walks.’”66  On its face this quote seems like compelling 
evidence that Jefferson believed carrying firearms generally in public was 
allowed and, indeed, an advisable course of action.
However, the flaws in this viewpoint become readily apparent when one 
looks at the full context of the Jefferson quotation, which reads: 
Give about two of them [hours], every day, to exercise; for health 
must not be sacrificed to learning.  A strong body makes the mind 
strong. As to the species of exercise, I advise the gun.  While this 
gives a moderate exercise to the body, it gives boldness, 
enterprise, and independence to the mind.  Games played with 
the ball, and others of that nature, are too violent for the body, 
and stamp no character on the mind.  Let your gun therefore be 
the constant companion of your walks. Never think of taking a 
book with you.  The object of walking is to relax the mind. You 
 63.  Adams, supra note 56, at 2577–78.  
 64.  Id. at 2578. 
 65.  For a detailed analysis of Jefferson’s views on gun rights, see David Thomas Konig, 
Thomas Jefferson’s Armed Citizenry and the Republican Militia, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 250 (2008).  
 66.  Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124, 137(D.D.C. 2016) (citing 1 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 398 (H. A. Washington ed., 1853); Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 24, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March 5, 2018) (citing 1 THE WORKS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 398 (H. A. Washington ed., 1884).  
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should therefore not permit yourself even to think while you 
walk; but divert your attention by the objects surrounding you.67
The Jefferson quote is clearly about hunting and sports shooting for 
recreation and relaxation rather than travelling with a firearm for purposes 
of self-defense.68  The fact that Jefferson was speaking only of the limited 
circumstances of leisure is made even clearer by the eight words following 
the Grace Plaintiffs’ citation: “never think of taking a book with you.”69
Thomas Jefferson, perhaps the most ardent bibliophile of the founding 
generation, whose book collection constituted the Library of Congress’s 
original collection, who once proclaimed, “I cannot live without books,” 
obviously would not have admonished his nephew against taking books with 
him on his travels or everyday business.70
4.  Boston Tea Party 
Another absurd attempt to anecdotally tie the founders to a right to carry 
firearms in public cites to the participants in the Boston Tea Party.  Plaintiffs 
in a recent public carry case in Washington, D.C. cited to “[t]he Boston Tea 
Party’s ‘Indians’ [who] were ‘each arm’d with a hatchet or axe, and pair 
pistols.’”71  It should go without saying that the Tea Partiers’ violent and 
illegal conduct was clearly not representative of what conduct was 
considered legal or acceptable under normal circumstances.  This argument 
could equally be made for a right to violently seize and destroy private 
property to protest tax policy. 
B.  Compelled Arms Bearing as an Argument for A Right to Go Armed in 
Public.
Another weak argument often made by plaintiffs is that because, at 
certain times during the colonial and founding period, states required certain 
people to carry firearms for militia or other self-defense purposes, there is a 
general right to carry firearms in public.  In one recent case, the Plaintiffs 
 67.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Paris, Aug. 19, 1785) (on file with Yale Law 
School Library).
68.  Id.
 69.  See id.; see Mem. of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Applications for a 
Preliminary and/or Permeant Injunction at 15, Grace v. District of Columbia, No. 1:15-cv-02234-
RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 28, 2015). 
 70.  Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Library, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://bit.ly/1qBambE 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2019).  
 71.  Appellant’s Reply Brief at 17, Wrenn v. District of Columbia, No. 16-7025 (D.C. Cir. 
July 27, 2016) (citing LETTERS OF JOHN ANDREWS, ESQ., OF BOSTON, 1772-1776 13 (Winthrop 
Sargent, ed., 1866). 
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argued: “Plainly, if the law imposed on individuals a civic duty to bear arms 
‘for public-safety reasons,’ the law necessarily conferred on those citizens a 
corresponding right to do so.”72  This argument refers to militia and militia-
related laws passed in several states during the colonial and founding period 
requiring, for example, citizens to bring arms to church on Sundays or to 
carry arms when leaving the secured area of a settlement.73  Similarly, all of 
the American colonies with the exception of Pennsylvania had militia laws 
requiring citizens of the colony to bear arms in the state militia in certain 
circumstances.74  Again, despite the readily apparent flaws in this argument, 
it has been adopted by at least one court in a decision striking down public 
carry licensing systems.75
 72.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 22–23, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March 
5, 2018) (stating “about half the colonies had laws requiring arms-carrying in certain 
circumstances”) (citing NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON & DAVID B. KOPEL ET AL., FIREARMS LAW & THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT 106–08 (2012) (internal citations omitted).  The Gould plaintiffs also cited 
to founding era state constitutional provisions granting a right to ‘bear arms in defense of 
themselves and the state’ or ‘bear arms in defense of himself and the state,” and claiming the “ 
language that is not amenable to a homebound interpretation.”  Id. at 23.  For the reasons below, 
the argument also fails to support a broad right to public carry.  See also Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 18, Malpasso v. Pallozzi, No. 18-2377 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 2018) (Similar arguments).
 73.  See, e.g., 1631 Va. Acts 173, Acts Of February 24th, 1631, Acts XLVII, XLVIII, LI, 
available at https://archive.org/details/statutesatlargeb01virg (“Act XLVII: No man shall go or send 
abroade without a sufficient party well armed. Act XLVIII: No man shall go to work in the grounds 
without their arms, and a sentinel upon them. Act LI: All men that are fitting to bear arms, shall 
bring their pieces to the church . . .”); another such law states: 
Whereas it is necessary for the security and defence of this province for internal 
dangers and insurrections that all persons resorting to places of public worship shall 
be obliged to carry arms . . . every male white inhabitant of this province (the 
inhabitants of the sea port towns only excepted who shall not be obliged to carry 
any other than side arms) who is or shall be liable to bear arms in the militia either 
at common musters or times of alarm, and resorting, on any Sunday or other times, 
to any church, or other place of divine worship within the parish where such person 
shall reside, shall carry with him a gun, or a pair of pistols, in good order and fit 
for service, with at least six charges of gun powder and ball, and shall take the said 
gun or pistols with him to the pew or seat. 
An Act for the Better Security of the Inhabitants by Obliging the Male White Persons to Carry Fire 
Arms to Places of Public Worship states 1770, reprinted in 1775-1770 Georgia Colonial Laws 471 
(1932).
 74.  See, e.g., 1693 Mass. Acts 128 (“That all male persons from sixteen years of age to sixty, 
(other than such as are hereinafter excepted), shall bear arms and duely attend all musters and 
military exercises of the respective troops”); 12 Hening’s Statutes c. 1, p. 9 et seq. (The defense 
and safety of the commonwealth depend upon having its citizens properly armed and taught the 
knowledge of military duty . . . All free male persons between the ages of eighteen and fifty 
years . . .  shall be inrolled or formed into companies.  There shall be a private muster of every 
company once in two months.). 
 75.  Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124, 136–37 (D.D.C. 2016).  
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Like the anecdotes discussed above, this argument breaks down after 
the slightest analysis.  The fact that at certain times in American history the 
states, or the federal government, have compelled citizens to carry arms is 
irrelevant to modern questions about whether a citizen has an individual right 
to carry firearms.  Government-mandated arms-bearing in situations in 
which national or state security is threatened clearly does not indicate broad 
acceptance of a private right to carry firearms in public.  Carrying arms when 
compelled by the government or acting under government authority has been 
an exception to the general prohibition on carrying arms since at least 1328, 
when the Statute of Northampton, the English prohibition on carrying 
weapons in public, excluded from its general prohibition: 
[T]he King’s Servants in his presence, and his ministers in 
executing of the King’s Precepts, or of their Office, and such be 
in their company assisting them, and also [u]pon a Cry made for 
Arms to keep the Peace, and the same in such places where such 
acts happen.76
During the founding period, prominent treatises made clear that going 
armed as part of the militia, posse comitatus, or in defense of the community 
was excluded from the generalized prohibition on armed public carry.  
Treatise writer William Hawkins, for example, stated that “no person is 
within the intention of the said statute [prohibiting carrying weapons], who 
arms himself to suppress rioters, rebels, or enemies and endeavors to 
suppress rioters, rebels, or enemies and endeavors to suppress such 
disturbers of the peace or quiet of the Realm.”77  Similarly, the Recorder of 
London, the Senior Circuit Court Judge in the Criminal Court, in an opinion 
about the legality of certain local self-defense organizations, stated: “The 
lawful purposes for which arms may be used (besides immediate self-
defence) are, the suppression of violent and felonious breaches of the peace 
and assistance of the civil magistrate in the execution of the laws, and the 
defence of the kingdom against foreign invaders.”78
 76.  Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, 258, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.).  
 77.  HAWKINS, supra note 60, at 136.  
 78.  Legality of the London Military Foot-Association, reprinted in WILLIAM BLIZZARD,
DESULTORY REFLECTIONS ON POLICE 59, 63 (1785).  Gun rights litigants have attempted to 
characterize this opinion as supporting a broad right to carry firearms in public, by pointing out the 
suppressing riots and repelling invasions is not something that could have been done from the 
comfort of home.  Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief at 22, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March 
5, 2018).  This characterization strips the opinion of its context and mischaracterizes its scope as 
dramatically broader than it actually is.  The opinion addressed the legality London Military Foot 
Association, a protestant self-defense organization and found that because “the possession and use 
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In 1886, shortly after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court made clear that the duty to carry arms when compelled by 
the government did not create a reciprocal right to form armed groups in 
Presser v. Illinois.79  In Presser, the Court upheld a conviction for organizing 
and parading with a private militia company.  The Court rejected the claim 
that militia participation outside of a government-organized militia is 
protected, stating: 
Military organization and military drill and parade under arms 
are subjects especially under the control of the government of 
every country.  They cannot be claimed as a right independent of 
law.  Under our political system they are subject to the regulation 
and control of the State and Federal governments, acting in due 
regard to their respective prerogatives and powers.  The 
Constitution and laws of the United States will be searched in 
vain for any support to the view that these rights are privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States independent of 
some specific legislation on the subject.80
Similarly, while the government can compel its citizens to carry 
machine guns and sawed-off shotguns through a military draft, the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Miller, which upheld a prohibitive tax on sawed-
off shotguns, made clear that there is not a reciprocal right to own those 
weapons in a private capacity.81  This is true of other duties as well.  While 
every American man has a duty to serve in the military if drafted, there is no 
parallel right to serve in the military.  Similarly, while there is a duty to serve 
on a jury if called, there is no complimentary right to actually serve on a 
jury.82
of, to certain purposes, is lawful . . . it cannot be unlawful to learn to use them (for such lawful 
purposes) with safety and effect,” and because in some cases arms may only be used collectively, 
there is also a right to be “collectively, as well as individually, instructed.”  Legality of the London 
Military Foot-Association, supra note 78 at 60–61.  The opinion made clear though that the right 
was but also “a duty[] for all subjects of the realm . . . to assist the sheriff, and other civil magistrates 
, in the execution of the laws and the preservation of the public peace.”  Id. at 60.  The recorder 
also made clear “that this right which every protestant most unquestionably possesses individually, 
may, and in many cases must, be exercised collectively.”  Id. at 60.  
 79.  116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
 80.  Presser, 116 U.S. at 267. 
 81.  See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (upholding the National Firearms Act’s 
prohibition on sawed-off shotguns); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008). 
 82.  A criminal defendant does have a right to a jury of his peers, and potential jurors have a 
right not to be discriminated against based solely based on race.  See Batson v. Kentucky,  476 U.S. 
79 (1986). 
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C.  Dangerous and Unusual Weapons as a Limitation on English and 
Founding-Era American Public Carry Regulations. 
Another dubious historical argument often made by plaintiffs in Second 
Amendment challenges is that English and early-American law only 
prohibited the carrying of a limited class of “dangerous and unusual 
weapons.”83  This view stems from language in Heller interpreting a line in 
William Blackstone’s eighteenth-century commentaries, “going armed, with 
dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by 
terrifying the good people of the land.”84  Proponents of a broad right to carry 
interpret “dangerous or unusual” much more narrowly than Blackstone 
intended, essentially arguing that Justice Scalia’s decision to strike down a 
handgun ban in Heller in 2008 meant that Blackstone would not have 
considered handguns “dangerous or unusual” weapons to carry in public in 
the 1700s. 
Justice Scalia used Blackstone’s “dangerous or unusual” language as a 
way to reconcile the Heller decision with the Supreme Court’s 1939 decision 
in United States v. Miller, which upheld a federal law banning automatic 
weapons and sawed-off shotguns.85  The Supreme Court in Miller clearly 
upheld the law under a militia-based reading of the Second Amendment, 
stating that because sawed-off shotguns lacked a “reasonable relationship to 
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,” the Second 
Amendment does not protect a right to possess them.86  Justice Scalia read 
the decision narrowly as only indicative of what types of weapons could be 
prohibited, stating the case found that the Second Amendment “does not 
protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for 
lawful purposes.”87  Reaching for a Founding-Era analogue to his view that 
particular weapons could be banned, Scalia referenced the “dangerous or 
unusual” language used by Blackstone.88  Justice Scalia was not altering 
Blackstone’s eighteenth century understanding of the phrase—or 
interpreting its substantive meaning at all—but rather reasoning by historical 
analogy in the distinct context of weapon prohibitions, rather than public 
carry regulation.  Unfortunately, a few courts have failed to distinguish 
between these contexts. 
In a recent Ninth Circuit decision, the court used gun rights proponents’ 
interpretation of the phrase to argue that the carrying of handguns could not 
 83.  See e.g., Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 84.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 148–49 (1769). 
 85.  Miller, 307 U.S. 174. 
 86.  Id. at 177. 
 87.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.  
 88.  Id. at 627. 
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have fit into the historical prohibition on going armed with dangerous or 
unusual weapons.  The court reasoned that classifying handguns as 
“dangerous and unusual” would be inconsistent with Heller, which said 
prohibitions on dangerous and unusual weapons were constitutional while 
striking down a handgun ban.89  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit stated in a 
decision striking down an Illinois prohibition on carrying firearms in public, 
“the Court cannot have thought all guns are ‘dangerous or unusual’ and can 
be banned, as otherwise there would be no right to keep a handgun in one’s 
home for self-defense.”90
This anachronistic analysis, using a twenty-first century Supreme Court 
decision on a different Second Amendment issue—home possession—to 
alter the meaning of an eighteenth-century tradition is inconsistent with the 
history of how the Statute of Northampton and its founding era analogues 
were enforced.  In addition, gun rights plaintiffs do not identify any weapons 
that would have been considered “dangerous or unusual” in the founding era 
and earlier if guns do not fall within that category.  Indeed, it is difficult to 
imagine what would fall within that set if guns were excluded. 
Excluding guns from the prohibitions in the Statute of Northampton as 
applicable during the Founding Era is a clear misreading of the historical 
record.  Every piece of evidence about the understanding and enforcement 
of the law points to its application to weapons generally.  To start with the 
Statute of Northampton, simply prohibited a person to “go nor ride armed,” 
without any requirement about a weapon’s dangerousness.91  Two centuries 
later, after firearms became common, Queen Elizabeth I called for 
enforcement of the statute against those carrying “Daggers, Pistols, and such 
like, not only in Cities and Town, [but] in all parts of the Realm in common 
high[ways].”92  Similarly, guides for justices of the peace instructed them to 
 89.  Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018) (“clearly not all weapons can be 
characterized as ‘dangerous or unusual,’ else Heller’s exemption of Second Amendment protection 
for weapons of that kind would swallow the Amendment’s protections as a whole.”). 
 90.  Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 91.  Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, 258 c. 3 (1328) (Eng.).  Later versions of the statute 
used similar language. 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396) (Eng.) (prohibiting going or riding “by Night nor by 
Day armed . . . without the King’s special License.”). 
 92.  Patrick Charles, Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home, 60 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 1, 21 (2012).  Defendants were also charged for violating the statute for wearing pistols.  Rex 
v. Harwood, Quarter Sessions at Malton (Oct. 4-5, 1608), in 1 NORTH RIDING RECORD SOCIETY,
QUARTER SESSIONS RECORDS 132 (1884) (prosecution of defendant “armed and weaponed with a 
lance-staff plated with iron, pistolls, and other offensive weapons . . .”). 
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“arrest any person, not being in his highness service, who shall be found 
wearing [] guns, or pistols, of any sort.”93
Colonial and early state analogues of the Statute of Northampton also 
clearly covered firearms.  A 1686 New Jersey statute prohibited going armed 
with “any pocket pistol, skeins (a knife), stilettoes (a knife), daggers or dirks, 
or other unusual or unlawful weapons.”94  A few years later, Massachusetts 
prohibited public carry using analogous terms by calling for the arrest of 
anyone who “shall ride or go armed offensively.”95  Offensive weapons were 
a term of art akin to dangerous and unusual weapons that would have 
included “guns, pistols, daggers, and instruments of war,” but not necessarily 
a hatchet or horsewhip.96  Other early American statutes used similar terms, 
or directly prohibited going armed with handguns.97  Tennessee, for 
example, prohibited the carrying of “belt and pocket pistols,” describing 
them as “dangerous and unlawful weapons.”98
The best articulation of what the phrase “dangerous and unusual 
weapon” meant during the founding period comes from State v. Huntly, an 
1843 North Carolina Supreme Court opinion.99  In the case, Huntly was 
indicted for arming himself with “pistols, guns, knives and other dangerous 
and unusual weapons,” specifically a double-barreled rifle, which he used to 
threaten a neighbor over a business dispute.  Huntly, like many modern 
plaintiffs, argued that the firearm he carried did not qualify as a dangerous 
and unusual weapon.  The Huntly Court decisively rejected this argument, 
stating:100
 93.  1 GILBERT HUTCHESON, TREATISE ON THE OFFICES OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE app. I at 
xlviii (1806) (citing OLIVER CROMWELL, INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING CONSTABLES (1665)); see
also ROBERT GARDINER, THE COMPLEAT CONSTABLE 18 (1692).   
 94.  1686 N.J. Laws 289 (emphasis added).  
 95.  1784 Mass. Las 105, ch. 27.  
 96.  2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 665 (John Curwood 
ed., 8th ed. 1824); 
see also King v. Hutchinson, 168 Eng. Rep. 273, 276 (1784); SIR WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL &
CHARLES SPRENGEL GREAVES, TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 124 (1854); JOEL
PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF STATUTORY CRIMES 214 (1873). 
 97.  See e.g., 1821 Me. Laws 285, ch. 76, § 1 (“[No one] shall ride or go armed offensively, 
to the fear or terror of the [people].”); 1836 Mass Acts 750, §16 (Prohibiting going armed with “a 
dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon.”); 1838 Wisc. Laws 381, § 
16 (same); 1846 Mich. Laws 690, c. 162, § 16 (same). 
 98.  1821 Tenn. Pub. Acts 15-16, An Act to Prevent the Wearing of Dangerous and Unlawful 
Weapons, c. 13 (every person so degrading himself by carrying a dirk, sword cane, Spanish stiletto, 
belt or pocket pistols,” shall pay a fine). 
 99.  State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. 418 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1843). 
 100.  Id.
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It has been remarked, that a double-barreled gun, or any other 
gun, cannot in this country come under the description of 
‘unusual weapons,’ for there is scarcely a man in the community 
who does not own and occasionally use a gun of some sort.  But 
we do not feel the force of this criticism.  A gun is an ‘unusual 
weapon,’ wherewith to be armed and clad.  No man amongst us 
carries it about with him, as one of his every day 
accoutrements—as part of his dress—and never we trust will the 
day come when any deadly weapon will be worn or wielded in 
our peace loving and law-abiding State, as an appendage of 
manly equipment.101
This view aligns with that of Hawkins, who made clear that there are 
unique, limited circumstances in which it is expected for someone to be 
armed, such as noblemen wearing “weapons of fashion as swords, etc., or 
privy coats of mail.”102  Similarly, the use of weapons “being only for Sport” 
would have been considered lawful, because the weapons would not be 
deemed unusual and likely to terrify the public.103
Plaintiffs and some courts attempt to convert this broad and nuanced 
historical meaning into a much more cabined category based on dicta in 
Heller connecting the term “dangerous and unusual weapons” with 
prohibitions on machine guns.104  This approach imports language from a 
twenty-first century Supreme Court decision as an interpretive tool for 
understanding eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources.  This deference 
to modern judicial definitions rather than historical understanding misreads 
Heller and is fundamentally inconsistent with the core originalist cannon that 
legal texts have a fixed meaning established when a text was adopted.105
Further, under the gun rights reading, “dangerous and unusual 
weapons” seems to have been a null set during Blackstone’s period.  If 
carrying the weapons of the time—handguns, rifles, swords, and daggers—
was not prohibited, what would have been?  Machine guns were few and far 
between in Blackstone’s era, and it is doubtful he was concerned with a sailor 
returned from a long voyage going armed with a boomerang or a scimitar.  
 101.  Huntly, 25 N.C. 418. 
 102.  HAWKINS, supra note 96, at 489, 798.  
 103.  MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE 425, 443–44 (1737). 
 104.  Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Young v. Hawaii, 896 
F.3d 1044, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 105.  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 78 (2012). 
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Looking at the historical sources as a whole, the only reasonable reading of 
Blackstone’s term is that it covered firearms.
Conclusion
Courts considering challenges to public carry licensing laws are both 
interpreting the Second Amendment and making important public policy 
decisions. Who may carry firearms in public and under what circumstances 
are extremely important public safety issues.  Studies have shown substantial 
increases in gun assaults and murder when stringent laws regulating the 
carrying of firearms in public are repealed.106  The Supreme Court has 
mandated that history play a role in adjudicating the answer to these 
important public policy discussions.  The litigants and judges owe it to the 
public that will have to live under the law created by these cases to present 
and consider the best historical analysis possible. 
Unsupported and misleading historical arguments like those discussed 
here demean and undermine the judicial process.  How can citizens have 
faith in the courts when they are being presented with and make decisions 
based on tall tales, wildly out-of-context quotes, and intellectually dishonest 
arguments?  Our justice system deserves better. 
 106.  See John Donohue, Abhay Aneja et al., Right-to-Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A 
Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data and a State-Level Synthetic Control Analysis (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23510, 2018). 
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